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IRISH INDUSTRY, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND EUROPEAN 
INTEGRATION1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Irish economy is one in which, as in Europe in general, industrial activity is 
unevenly distributed.  Some sectors perform - and have developed - better than 
others.  Some have concentrated spatially to a greater extent than others.  Yet this 
uneven development has been the basis for Ireland's recent economic growth.  The 
causes of this unbalanced industrial development include a complex interplay of 
historical, cultural and institutional factors in addition to traditional comparative 
advantage.  All of these forces operate in the context of an increasingly integrated 
Europe. 
 
Ireland's economy can be characterised as one which is small and open.  A large 
percentage of Ireland's economic activity takes place in the international sector, 
through exports and imports.  In this paper we will examine different schools of trade 
theory and their respective explanations of differential industrial development 
between countries and regions.  We will examine to what extent these theories can 
describe Irish experience to date.  We will conclude by drawing out the implications 
for Irish trade and industrial policy in the future.  In general what we show is that 
‘lumpiness’ in the spatial concentration of industry is consistent both with the theories 
of international trade and the theories of industrial development. 
 
II. COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 
According to the traditional Ricardian comparative advantage theory of international 
trade, countries will specialise in the production and export of those goods in which 
they have a comparative advantage.  Even if Country A can produce, say, both cars 
and refrigerators better than Country B, as long as A is relatively better (cheaper, 
more efficient) at producing cars, then A will produce cars and export them to B, and 
B will produce refrigerators and export them to A.  What follows from this is an 
expectation that when barriers to trade are removed, there will be inter-industry 
specialisation;  the countries involved will begin to specialise in different industries, 
some countries producing and exporting more cars, and others producing and 
exporting more refrigerators.  Moreover, those that increase their production of cars 
will, it would be expected, transfer resources out of the refrigerator industry and 
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therefor produce fewer refrigerators.  All countries theoretically benefit from the 
increased productivity brought about this process of specialisation. 
 
Comparative advantage has been at the base of all neoclassical international trade 
theory (i.e. since the late 19th century).  The major innovation in neoclassical theory 
this century came with the development of the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) 
model.  This model has been at the core of neoclassical international trade theory at 
least up to the end of the 1980s, and it still is the central model in many text books.  
The HOS model rests heavily on comparative advantage.  It states that, with free 
trade, a country will export the good that uses most intensively the factor of 
production with which that country is most richly endowed.  The rich endowment of 
the factor makes that factor relatively cheaper, and therefore the production of that 
good relatively less expensive.  With lower relative production costs, this good will be 
the one that is exported.  It is in this latter sense that HOS is based on comparative 
advantage.2  The conclusion from HOS is little different from that of simple 
comparative advantage, namely that, in a free trade context, there will be inter-
industry specialisation among countries.  What HOS adds is that the reason for this 
inter-industry specialisation is the difference between countries in endowments of the 
different factors of production. 
 
The policy implication of these theories is that all countries would be better off if 
there were no intervention by states in international trade, allowing each country to 
specialise in its most efficient, least cost industry.  However, both the comparative 
advantage theory and this policy conclusion have come under critical scrutiny.  
Development economists3, for example, have for long held that:   
 
(1) the assumptions upon which comparative advantage theory is based, such as 
perfect competition and perfect mobility of resources, do not hold, and 
therefore the theory itself does not hold;  
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(2) comparative advantage theory is static, and does not allow for dynamic 
effects, as in the case of planned, created comparative advantage and the 
important role of leading industries;4  
 
(3) the theory does not take into consideration distribution effects, such as the 
extent to which inter-industry specialisation within an economy may reduce 
the welfare of those whose livelihood depended on the good whose 
production is cut back;  and, 
 
(4) among relatively less developed countries (LDCs), a dualism can emerge as 
a result of trade with more developed countries (MDCs), in which there is an 
advanced, wealthy, high employment sector and a technologically backward, 
poor, high unemployment sector, with little relationship between them.5 
 
Donaldson (1984, p.267), having considered such issues, concludes that "free trade 
(that is, trade that is carried on without LDC government intervention of any kind) for 
a developing LDC in the real world situation is only rarely the optimal policy."  
 
Other criticisms of comparative advantage and/or HOS have followed from the 
Leontief Paradox.  In the 1950s and 1960s, Leontief undertook research on US trade 
patterns.  His results unexpectedly showed that the US seemed to export labour 
intensive products.  HOS would have predicted that as the US is a capital rich 
country, it should export capital rather than labour intensive goods.  Alternative 
theories were therefor required.  
 
To account for Leontief's Paradox a number of theories provided alternative 
explanations for the flows of goods and services between countries.  Of the 
economists whose work has influenced post-Leontief international trade theory, the 
most important is probably Paul Krugman. 
 
 
 
                                                     
4
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III. ECONOMIES OF SCALE AND TRANSPORTATION 
Krugman (1987a, 1987b, 1993) has been prominent in international trade theory, 
strategic trade policy and the geography of trade, though the originality of his 
contributions has sometimes been questioned.6  He has argued that, in addition to 
comparative advantage as a determinant of the nature and direction of flows of 
goods and services between countries, product differentiation, economies of scale 
and imperfect competition must be added.7 
 
The need for alternative explanations for the nature and direction of trade flows 
followed not just from Leontief, but also from other empirical work.  At its simplest, 
what this work showed was that when barriers to trade were removed in Europe, the 
expected inter-industry specialisation did not emerge.  When the Common Market 
was formed, the economies that had been involved in car production, for example, 
continued to manufacture cars.  Those that were involved in the production of other 
consumer durables, like refrigerators and washing machines, continued to 
manufacture these also.  It was expected that some would specialise out of cars and 
into other products.  What did change was that a greater proportion of output was 
exported, and a greater proportion of local purchases was imported.  The choice 
facing consumers broadened.   
 
There was more product differentiation, expressing itself as intra-industry trade.  
Intra-industry specialisation took place, in which firms in one country produced 
certain types or makes of cars, and those in other countries produced other types or 
makes of cars.  There was specialisation within industries and not, as was 
expected, across industries. 
 
A related factor is one of economies of scale.  Once it is shown that the market 
structure is not perfectly competitive - which necessarily follows from the fact that the 
product is differentiated - then the neoclassical, perfectly competitive, long run 
equilibrium in which firms are producing at the bottom of their long run average cost 
curves no longer holds.  It becomes reasonable to assume that expanding firms 
could benefit from increasing returns to scale.  A firm (let us call it Firm A, in the 
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market for a good X) may now have an advantage in competition with other firms, 
domestic and foreign, simply because Firm A is producing on a larger scale and is 
therefore further down its average cost curve.  Because it has higher volumes, it has 
lower unit costs.  There are a number of possible reasons that Firm A may have 
higher volumes than its competitors, even assuming that the two firms have identical 
production functions.  These include that Firm A began producing earlier (first mover 
advantage), that Firm A's local market is bigger, or that Firm A began exporting 
earlier. 
 
Imperfect competition and economies of scale contribute to an understanding of 
uneven development.  They are elements of a process whereby, even in the 
absence of state intervention of any kind, production of a good can become 
concentrated in a particular place.  Firm A defeats all other firms in the market for X 
because it has lower costs.  Due to the existence of transportation costs all upstream 
and downstream production, distribution and other services associated with the 
production of X are now more likely to be located near to Firm A.  Other products 
using similar inputs - or downstream services - to those of X may now also have an 
incentive to locate near to Firm A.   The result is a concentration of economic activity 
in that place.   
 
It is important to emphasise that this result could be a consequence of factors other 
than comparative advantage.  Firm A may experience lower costs arising from 
economies of scale, for example, which more than offset relatively higher costs of 
factors of production in that place.    
 
Krugman (1993, p.98) sums up the impact of economies of scale by concluding that 
"producers have an incentive to concentrate production of each good or service in a 
limited number of locations".   He factors in "the costs of transactions across 
distance:"  
 
the preferred locations for each individual producer are those where 
demand is large or supply of inputs is particularly convenient - which 
in general are the locations chosen by other producers.  Thus 
concentrations of industry, once established, tend to be self-
sustaining;  this applies both to the localisation of individual industries 
and to such grand agglomerations as the Boston-Washington 
corridor. 
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The somewhat contradictory result of this kind of analysis, is an explanation for why, 
in the period following the removal of barriers to trade, various goods continued to be 
produced in more than one of the member countries of the European Economic 
Community, on the one hand, and why industry and multi-industry agglomerations 
developed in specific locations, on the other.  The result depended on the relative 
weights of the different factors: the more important was product differentiation - or 
intra-industry specialisation - the more likely it was that production in this industry 
continued to take place in a number of locations.  The more important were the 
economies of scale, and the more advantageous the local conditions in one 
particular place, the more likely it was that production would become concentrated in 
that place.  Local conditions, high transaction costs across distance and economies 
of scale in a number of industries together explain "grand agglomerations" emerging 
at different levels of industrial disaggregation.8 
 
It might appear from these conclusions that there is a justification in Krugman's work 
for strategic trade policy.  This is policy that is aimed for example at developing a 
comparative advantage in a particular industry.  Strategic trade policy is often applied 
as industrial policy, focusing on positive encouragement of development, for example 
through subsidies, rather than through negative prevention of competition through 
tariffs.  However, Krugman has consistently argued that free trade (and the absence 
of strategic trade policy) continues to be best from an international welfare 
perspective.  "The problem is", he writes, "that while strategic trade policies may be 
in any one country's interest, if all countries pursue them the result may be to block 
mutually beneficial integration" (1987b, p.121).  While perhaps theoretically 
defensible, this vision of universal international forbearance appears utopian.  
 
Analogously, it could be argued that a particular state's industrial policy encouraging 
inward foreign direct investment (FDI) could be beneficial to that economy, but if 
other states introduced similar policies this could cease to be the case.  The "price" 
to be paid for the FDI would be bid up.  The end result would be a redistribution of 
wealth from the relatively poorer taxpayers in each state to the relatively wealthy 
owners of the multinational corporations (MNCs).  It follows though that a country's 
strategic trade policies can succeed if other countries either are not aware of them or 
are tardy in implementing their own policies.  A second possibility is that richer states 
DCU Business School 
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are willing to tolerate these policies in the poorer state for developmental or other 
political reasons. 
 
In the case of Ireland's encouragement of FDI, it has been relatively successful 
because Ireland was among the first European locations to have a well-organised 
strategy of this kind, and because, although the policy contravenes the spirit of the 
Treaty of Rome, it has been allowed by the EU as a means to bring Ireland's level of 
economic development up to the European average.  The gap between levels of 
economic activity in Ireland and the European core was in fact reduced by the 
industrial strategy of encouraging FDI.  In the future, however, Ireland must beware 
of bidding away any potential benefits in competition with other states.   
 
IV. AGGLOMERATION AND CLUSTERS9 
What follows from the work of Marshall as updated by Krugman (1993), is that, 
under certain circumstances, firms within an industry or in related industries will 
agglomerate, that is they will locate in the same place, close to one another.  The 
agglomeration economies will be greater than the benefits that firms could derive 
from a more diffuse locational distribution. 
 
A locality or region may become the site for an expansion of common pools of 
labour, capital and infrastructure.  Pecuniary externalities may arise when new 
investments are made by firms in some particular place.  In such a case the 
reduction in unit costs arising from the externalities are called agglomeration 
economies (Harrison, 1992). 
 
Agglomerations of various kinds are probably the norm.  It is likely that a higher 
proportion of the industrial output of the economies of the world is accounted for by 
production in agglomerations than by production in stand-alone firms, evenly 
distributed around geographic space.  This is consistent with Porter's (1990, p.18) 
argument that "firms based in particular nations achieve international success in 
distinct segments and industries".  He rejects the traditional comparative advantage 
model mainly because its assumptions are unrealistic.  The recent revisions in 
international trade theory around economies of scale and the consequences of other 
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market imperfections, he writes (1990, p.16), leave unanswered the question that is 
for him the most important:  "Which nation's firms will reap them [these economies] 
and in what industries?"  Porter's theoretical and empirical contributions have been in 
attempting to answer this question. 
 
Porter's primary tool for illustrating "patterns of national advantage" is the cluster 
chart.  This chart includes the successful (competitive) industries of a country, 
identified as such either by having "a world export share greater than the nation's 
average share of world exports or an international position based on foreign 
investment that was estimated to be as significant" (1990, pp.287-288).  Having 
identified the patterns of national advantage with the cluster chart, he explains them 
with four factors he calls the "diamond".  These factors are: (1) factor conditions 
(including all factors of production, as well as means such as training and education 
for improving those factors of production); (2) demand conditions (for example, the 
bigger the home demand for an industry's product, the better); (3) related and 
supporting industries (the presence in a country of internationally competitive 
supplier industries, for example, will enhance the competitiveness of the buyer 
industries); and (4) firm strategy, structure and rivalry (including domestic rivalry, and 
rules and institutions governing that rivalry - the more intense the domestic rivalry, 
the greater the potential for the firms to be internationally competitive) (1990, p.71). 
 
Porter's clusters are firms and industries connected through horizontal and vertical 
relationships.   Vertical links are those, such as buyer/supplier, involving firms up or 
downstream from one another in the process of converting raw materials into 
consumer goods.  Horizontal links are those between industries, for example, firms 
in two industries may have common customers, technologies or distribution 
channels.  Because of agglomeration economies, clustering "works best when the 
industries involved are geographically concentrated" (Porter, 1990, p. 157). 
 
The work of Porter and Krugman on industrial agglomeration reinforce one another.  
Krugman shows how, from the perspective of international trade, industries can 
become concentrated in particular places, and Porter shows how, from the 
perspective of links between firms and industries within a country, agglomeration 
contributes to international competitiveness. 
 
The work on the potential for industrial agglomerations and their contribution to a 
country's international trade has not been without critics.  Dunning (1992), for 
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example, argues that Porter's focus does not adequately incorporate MNCs.  He 
points out that Nestlè, though a Swiss company, has 95 per cent of sales accounted 
for by its foreign subsidiaries.  The diamonds of competitive advantage of the host 
countries in which those subsidiaries operate may therefore have more to do with 
Nestlè's contribution to Switzerland's GNP than Switzerland's own diamond of 
competitive advantage.  Dunning suggests the addition of a transnational business 
variable as a separate factor in the diamond of competitive advantages.   
 
Scasselati (1991) would agree with this,10 though he goes even further (perhaps too 
far), in criticising Porter's focus on national entities.  He emphasises corporations 
that in "their inherent drive toward ever expanding accumulation,... simply cannot 
afford to tie themselves to any territory".  It can be observed, however, that MNCs, 
though not committed to any one location, are developing long term relationships in 
various locations with such collaborative partners as suppliers providing components 
and services (Sabel, 1996). 
 
Jacobs and de Jong (1991) have two fundamental criticisms of Porter's approach.  
They argue, firstly, that there is an over-emphasis on end product.  In their 
application of the model to the Netherlands, for example, they find that a cluster may 
be in an intermediate stage and not at the end-use stage.  This makes it difficult to 
accurately identify the cluster in Porter's chart.  Second, the approach is one-sided in 
that international diversity is stressed.  While Jacobs and de Jong accept that both 
international divergence and convergence are evident, Porter's approach, in their 
view, does not capture the dynamic relationship between the two tendencies. 
 
The first of these observations is most applicable to the Irish case.  A full Porterian 
cluster may be too extensive, spreading beyond the scale and capacity of a small, 
open economy like Ireland's (O'Donnellan, 1994).  In such economies, the domestic 
market may be too small to generate national clusters.  Larger economic spaces 
may have to be analysed in order to identify the extent to which industries in Ireland 
may be elements in, for example, a European cluster. 
 
Despite these criticisms, Porter is praised for introducing "the idea to an audience of 
economists that globalization somewhat paradoxically leads to more emphasis on 
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local conditions, and moreover, provides a global firm [with] opportunities to take 
advantage of these" (Jacobs and de Jong, 1991). 
 
The cluster literature contributes to our understanding of why there are differences 
between the industrial structure in Ireland and that in the European core.  If there are 
advantages to be gained for firms to locate near to other, related firms, then the 
relative paucity of industrial development in Ireland was itself a factor in reducing 
Ireland's attractiveness to industrial enterprises.  Relative success in encouraging 
the establishment of subsidiaries of foreign owned firms would not, by itself, increase 
the general attractiveness of Ireland as a location to firms not receiving the artificial 
attractions of low tax rates, and capital and training grants.  Only if linkages develop 
among firms can the advantages of agglomeration be reaped.   
 
When these linkages do develop, however, they advantage the participating firms, 
and differentiate the firms in the cluster and their associated location from firms and 
areas outside of it.  In this way, while clusters can be the means of reducing the gap 
between one economy and another, they can also be the means of increasing 
differences between locations within economies. 
 
V. UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT AND CUMULATIVE CAUSATION 
Basing their arguments on the theory of comparative advantage, many development 
economists have contended that contact between more and less developed regions 
will benefit all parties and lead to convergence of living standards.  Other 
development theorists have argued that such contact leads to increasing disparities.  
While many of their arguments are not meant to apply within the developed world, 
some can be deployed to understand uneven development within industrialised 
regions. 
 
The description above of the interactive effects of economies of scale and the 
benefits of agglomeration can be seen as a specific instance of a broader class of 
dynamic interactions.  The great institutionalist economist, Gunnar Myrdal, described 
such interactions as cumulative causation, describing virtuous and vicious circles.  
Prosperous regions attract labour and capital thereby improving conditions, services 
and infrastructure which further attracts additional labour and capital.  Investment 
increases demand which then draws further investment.  This dynamic can be 
summarised as success breeds success while failure breeds failure (Sawyer, 1989, 
pp.422-428).  The development task in such instances then becomes the breaking of 
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vicious circles of underdevelopment and the institution of virtuous circles of further 
development.11 
 
VI. INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURES 
We are now in a position to categorise the different ways in which firms interrelate to 
form industrial or inter-firm structures.  There are four main ways.  First, a firm can 
stand alone. This is where a firm has completely free, open market relationships with 
its suppliers; completely free, open market relationships with its customers; and it 
has no horizontal strategic alliances with similar firms.  A stand alone firm is a 
member of no networks, and would generally operate in highly effective markets in 
which there are, for example, large numbers of buyers and sellers of an 
undifferentiated product.  Such firms are not very common anymore, and are more 
likely in services such as retail shops than in manufacturing. 
 
Secondly, there are vertical associations of firms.  A large number of examples can 
be found in Ireland.  Many indigenous firms form close, vertical relationships with 
subsidiaries of multinationals.  Instances include software manual printing firms, 
producing manuals for particular software firms like Microsoft or Lotus, and Higgins 
Engineering in Galway producing components for Thermo King, the refrigerated 
truck company.  In vertical associations the buyer firm will trust the supplier to 
produce to high quality, with minimum (or zero) faults, and to a particular time 
schedule.  The buyer firm may have one or two such suppliers of the same 
component, but it will not call for tenders each time it buys.  It will simply select one 
of its small number of preferred suppliers. 
 
Thirdly, there are horizontal associations where groups of firms producing similar 
products, or different parts of the same product, associate with one another in co-
operative relationships.  Although there appear to be gains to be derived from this 
type of inter-firm structure, there are very few identified examples in Ireland.  An 
embryonic association of this type exists in the mid-west region, where a group of 
small and medium manufacturers of printed circuit boards has discussed the 
possibility of co-operating so as to obtain better conditions from their buyer 
companies, usually subsidiaries of multinationals.  For similar reasons a group of 
poultry growers in Monaghan formed an association which confronted their 
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monopsonistic buyer, Monaghan Poultry Products.  However, there are few 
examples of firms co-operating horizontally in an integrated production system.12 
 
Fourth, there are clusters as described in detail above.  A cluster is basically a 
combination of vertical and horizontal associations.   Agreements between firms may 
be formal or informal.  Firms may compete against one another in some respects 
and co-operate in others.  Porter (1990) considers a high level of competition to be 
essential in successful clusters.  While there is agreement that competition is 
important, others consider high levels of both competition and co-operation to be 
essential for successful industrial structures (de Bandt, 1986).  For a group of firms 
to constitute a cluster, there must be a number of firms producing the same or 
similar products and a number of other firms that buy from and/or sell to those firms.   
 
There is a great deal of evidence that successful firms are those that, particularly 
through horizontal associations and clusters, have close relationships with other 
firms.  Among the regions where evidence can be found to support this proposition 
are Emilia Romagna and Abruzzo in Italy, West Jutland in Denmark, and Wales 
(Cooke, 1996; Dunford and Hudson, 1996).  In all these places there are high levels 
of horizontal association, where groups of small firms co-operate in becoming 
internationally competitive.  They have come to be called "industrial districts", 
particularly in Emilia Romagna.  In Wales, clusters have formed including indigenous 
Welsh firms and subsidiaries of MNCs, including many Japanese MNCs.  All these 
regions have performed extremely well in terms of industrial growth and 
competitiveness, well above the European average.   
  
There is investment in creating such inter-firm structures which improve the 
competitiveness of the final product.  This reduces the 'footloose-ness' of the MNC 
participants, and increases their linkages with local industrial structures.  However, it 
also often increases the dependence of the local suppliers on the demand of the 
multinational. 
 
VII. APPLICATIONS TO IRELAND 
We have shown above that one of the factors leading to a change in international 
trade theory was the observed results of European integration.   International trade 
within Europe increased - as expected - as a result of the creation of the Common 
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Market.  However, the way in which that increase occurred was different from what 
had been expected.  An important element in the increase was intra-industry trade, in 
addition to inter-industry trade.  Rather than, say, Germany specialising in car 
production, and importing refrigerators and washing machines from Italy, both 
countries continued to produce both types of products.  Much of the increase in trade 
following the creation of the Common Market was accounted for by increase of both 
exports and imports within industries.  Ireland was no exception.  Ireland's accession 
to membership of the EC in 1973 was followed by an increase in trade with Europe, 
and a decline in Ireland's dependence on the UK as a trading partner.  A significant 
part of the increase in trade was primarily accounted for by intra-industry trade 
(McAleese, 1976;  Brülhart and McAleese, 1995). 
 
There are questions about how intra-industry trade is calculated.  It could be argued, 
for example, that the more disaggregated the industrial categories, the less intra-
industry, and the more inter-industry trade will be found.  Recent work by Brülhart 
and McAleese (1995) shows, however, that "even at a very high level of statistical 
disaggregation" there are "considerable amounts of intra-industry trade (IIT) in 
Ireland's external trade, particularly in the manufacturing sectors."   
 
The fact that Ireland's increase in trade with Europe following its membership of the 
EU was accounted for in part by intra-industry trade does not mean that European 
integration had no impact on Ireland's industrial structure.  Using the formula for 
revealed comparative advantage (RCA)13, Thornhill (1988) showed that, during the 
1970s, Ireland's comparative advantage shifted strongly away from resource-based 
and low-skill intensive industries, and towards high-skill, capital intensive industries.  
He identified three main industries accounting for this change:  food preparations 
(not elsewhere specified);  organic chemicals;  and office machines. The RCA 
approach clearly shows the increasing importance of several industries in Ireland's 
industrial structure and exports.  Thornhill's explanations for these results focus 
primarily on the nature of foreign direct investment (FDI).  MNCs had set up a 
number of subsidiaries in these industries, and in particular in the most important of 
them, organic chemicals and office machines. Thornhill does not distinguish between 
Ireland's EC and non-EC trade, nor does he suggest that membership of the EC may 
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have had an impact on the nature of FDI.  Rather, he suggests only that Ireland's 
level of development resulted in the change in the nature of the FDI.  We will 
consider in later sections the validity of this omission. 
 
In the mid-1980s Ireland's intra-industry trade stopped growing, and began to 
decline.  Inter-industry specialisation increased, in contrast with the "higher intra-
industry specialisation observed at the earlier stages of Irish trade liberalisation" 
(Brülhart and McAleese, 1995).   This inter-industry specialisation, Brülhart and 
McAleese find, was into "highly trade-oriented and highly productive sectors".  
(These are the same as the high-skill, highly capital intensive sectors referred to by 
Thornhill.)  Moreover, Ireland's intra-industry trade has in general been higher with 
fellow EC members than with non-members, and the decline in intra-industry trade in 
the mid-1980s was sharper in relation to intra-EC trade than rest-of-the-world (ROW) 
trade.  This represents an intensification in the 1980s of the trend noted by Thornhill 
- the increasing sophistication of industry in Ireland.  Brülhart and McAleese were the 
first to note that the increase in trade in the products of the advanced sectors is more 
pronounced in relation to Ireland's trade with EC partners than with the ROW.  This 
suggests that there is something about Ireland's relationship with the EC that has 
contributed to these changes in Ireland's industrial structure. 
 
Thornhill (1988) shows three main industries in relation to which Ireland apparently 
had a RCA in the 1970s:  food preparations (not elsewhere specified); office 
machinery; and organic chemicals.  Brülhart and McAleese (1995) show seven 
industries which had pronounced positive patterns of specialisation in the period 
1985 to 1990: office and data processing machines;  pharmaceuticals;  
radio/TV/sound equipment;  cocoa, sweets;  miscellaneous processed foodstuffs;  
domestic chemicals and man-made fibres;  and spirit distilling, compounding.  Given 
that Brülhart and McAleese used a more disaggregated data set, there is a great 
deal of similarity between the two sets of industries found to be those in which 
Ireland has a "revealed" comparative advantage.   
 
All of the main international trade theories discussed above would have predicted 
specialisation and resultant concentration of resources in one or a few industries.  
From the work of Porter and others, as discussed above, the question arises as to 
whether or to what extent these concentrations can be explained by traditional 
comparative advantage, economies of scale and proximity, or the benefits of 
industrial agglomeration and clustering. 
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We will consider in turn the three industrial groupings discussed above:  food, 
chemicals/pharmaceuticals and computers/electronics.  As O’Donnellan (1994) has 
shown, each of these exhibits some characteristics of a Porterian cluster.  In 
particular, they all have shares of sectoral world exports greater than Ireland’s overall 
share of world exports.  Of these, only food also showed evidence of a high level of 
what he calls “systematic clustering” - highly clustered on the basis of a number of 
different definitions of clustering.  The different definitions of clustering used by 
O’Donnellan (1994) are: a) trade share;14   b) concentration of purchases within own 
sector;  c) domestic share of purchases;  d) domestic share of sales;  e) 
concentration of firms within counties;  f) concentration of employment within 
counties;  g) association of sectors within regions;  and, h) share of UK/Irish 
industrial employment.  Some food-related sub-sectors appear under all these 
definitions with the exception of d) and g).  Chemicals/pharmaceutical sub-sectors 
appear only under a), e), f) and g).  Computers/electronics sub-sectors appear only 
under a) and e).  He goes on to argue that there is little evidence of the productivity 
and/or innovation enhancing effects with which clustering is supposed to be 
associated, not even for the food sector. 
 
From the point of view of the revisionists of traditional trade  theory, O'Donnellan's 
results for the food sector send a mixed message.  On the one hand, there is 
evidence of clustering.  On the other hand, it would appear that the origin of any 
specialisation in this sector would have more to do with comparative advantage, 
specifically HOS comparative advantage.  The proximity to intensively used raw 
materials in agriculture must be a large part of any explanation of the success of this 
sector. 
 
The failure to discover clustering in the chemical/pharmaceutical industry is not 
surprising.  This industry is one which has resulted from artificial incentives being 
offered to MNCs to set up subsidiaries in Ireland (Jacobson, 1991, p.56).  In general, 
they import bulk chemicals, process them, and re-export them in bulk.  Few firms 
have developed linkages with indigenous firms or with one another.  Their continued 
presence in Ireland is based on low corporate tax rates, and, at least until recently, 
the relatively lax monitoring of the firms for environmental pollution.  As the EU 
                                                     
14
 Sector’s share of world exports more than four times Irish national average shares.  Note that all the 
definitions are based on data from the mid- and late 1980s;  a repeat of O’Donnellan’s research based 
on more recent data could give different results. 
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begins to require a harmonisation of tax rates and environmental standards rise, the 
continuation of a concentration of this industry in Ireland will be called into question.   
 
The failure to find evidence of clustering in the computer/electronics sector is more 
doubtful.  Some of O'Donnellan's criteria, such as domestic purchases and sales 
cannot be applied to an internationally oriented export industry.  The history of the 
high technology sector contains the paradigmatic examples of clustering in Silicon 
Valley and the Route 128 area in Massachusetts.  It seems unlikely that the 
continued attractiveness of Ireland for inward high technology investment is 
unrelated to the presence of existing firms in this sector. There are also concrete 
examples of high levels of linkage in this sector, as among firms supplying inputs into 
Apple’s production processes in Cork.  This industry in Ireland began with similar 
artificial attractions to those which brought the chemical/pharmaceutical MNCs to 
Ireland.  However, this may now have developed into an example of a “created” 
comparative advantage, with the availability of high levels of relevant skills a 
consequence of a conscious policy of focusing education and training as well as IDA 
attention in this sector.   
 
At a more general level, there are a number of reasons why studies such as 
O'Donnellan's may find it difficult to identify clustering in the Irish case.  First, it is 
possible that the reduction in transport and communications costs has increased the 
area within which agglomeration must take place for economies to be reaped.  This 
would be consistent with Kennedy’s (1991, p.99) view that: 
 
Ireland, as a member of an increasingly integrated European 
Community, is becoming more akin to a small region within a large 
country.  In general a region will display a much lower degree of 
linkage than the country of which it forms part, and the smaller the 
region the lower the overall degree of intra-regional linkage.    
 
It is likely in relation to information, for example, that the costs of transmission are 
similar from Ireland to Bonn and from Munich to Bonn.  This enhances the possibility 
of firms in Ireland participating in a European cluster. 
 
Second, evidence of economies of agglomeration may be hidden in the aggregation 
of the data.  Clustering may be taking place on a smaller scale of operations.  For 
example, vertical associations of firms, by definition narrower than clusters, may 
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exist, and may engender economies of agglomeration and/or of association.  As 
O’Donnellan (1994, p.230) puts it,  
 
there may well be more subtle and localised clustering happening in 
some sectors that does make a difference to performance and that 
should be reinforced by government support for local specialised 
infrastructure.  Possible examples are the dairy industry in Munster, 
computers and chemicals in Cork, clothing in Donegal, aerospace in 
Shannon/Limerick, furniture in Navan, and some sectoral pockets of 
firms in Dublin. 
 
Sub-sectors on which research has been done, and where significant evidence of 
localised economies of very localised agglomeration and/or association exists, 
include the software manual printing industry in Dublin (Jacobson and O’Sullivan, 
1994) and the wooden furniture industry in Co. Monaghan (Mottiar, 1996;  Jacobson 
and Mottiar, 1996). 
 
These apparently contradictory explanations for the absence of Porterian clusters 
are, in fact, reconcilable.  On the one hand, as defined by Porter, clusters may 
require larger economies than Ireland’s;  O’Donnellan considers the UK and Ireland 
as an economic area within which clusters might exist, while Kennedy goes even 
further to consider linkages within the European Community as a whole.  On the 
other hand, small groups of small and medium enterprises (SMEs), as in the 
software manual printing industry, have sprung up to service subsidiaries of 
multinationals in Dublin, despite the existence of equivalent firms elsewhere in 
Europe.  The point is that in some cases there are relatively few disadvantages to 
different parts of a cluster being widely dispersed, for example, where the product 
has a high value-to-weight ratio.  In other cases, there are high costs of 
transportation and/or high economies of proximity, for example, where just-in-time 
inventories require close monitoring of the supplier by the buyer.   
 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
All brands of trade theory suggest that development in the context of an international 
market is likely to be ‘lumpy’, that is concentrated in a few sectors and places rather 
than taking place smoothly across the board.  In these circumstances, industrial 
development must rely on attracting lumps of economic activity within the borders of 
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the state.  The debate over industrial policy is about whether a process of 
specialisation through comparative advantage will arise from purely market driven 
transactions, or whether there is a role for the state in encouraging the 
agglomeration of economic activity.   
 
Ireland's experience in the food sector provides some evidence for the comparative 
advantage perspective, though agriculture can hardly be said to be devoid of 
government intervention.  The success in attracting investment in the 
electronics/computer sector, a leading industry which may lay the foundations for 
further development, is a striking instance of the potential relevance of industrial 
policy.  By contrast, Ireland's flirtation with the chemical industry may prove relatively 
short-lived as well as ill-advised.  Its incompatibility with the “green” image Ireland 
wishes to project in marketing its food and providing lifestyle amenities for high tech. 
foreign investors militates against further development in this field.  
 
If this analysis is correct, then Ireland’s recent success as the “emerald tiger” 
(Newsweek, 1996), to the extent that it is dependent on sectors like 
chemicals/pharmaceuticals, is likely to be fragile.  To the extent that it is dependent 
on the processes by which Ireland has specialised into the food and 
electronics/computers sector, it is likely to be more lasting.  Even in these sectors 
there are significant challenges, such as the decline in funds available to agriculture 
through the Common Agricultural Policy, and the competition to 
electronics/computers from low cost third world producers.  This last includes some 
countries like India where there are increasingly high levels of such skills as software 
design and development and an English speaking workforce. 
 
The policy conclusions which may be drawn from Irish experience include the 
identification of those sub-sectors in which there are no incentives for agglomeration 
or, in contrast, incentives for dispersal. Relatively costly attempts to encourage 
linkages in these sub-sectors must be avoided.  More positively, it will be important 
to identify localised clusters and sub-clusters - industrial districts, networks and 
filieres (Jacobson and Andréosso-O’Callaghan, 1996, Ch.3) - and encourage them 
through appropriate physical and financial infrastructures.  It is particularly important 
to provide general incentives for higher levels of co-operation among Irish firms.15  In 
                                                     
15
 “There has historically been hardly any long-term cooperation between Irish small firms in the 
provision of purchasing, marketing, financial services or through supply linkages” (O’Sullivan, 1995, 
p.386). 
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our view, without such development, Irish economic success is unlikely to be 
sustained in the long run. 
 
 If one problem for policy is encouraging or attracting ‘lumps’ (centres of 
development) within the economy, a complementary problem is the encouragement 
of development in the economic spaces between the lumps.  Traditional perspectives 
have assumed that development would spread organically through the expansion of 
the market which would result from increased economic activity and rising incomes.  
This kind of process was behind the balanced development of the pioneering 
capitalist economies of Europe and America.  A different prospect faces late 
industrialisers in the context of a global economy.  Even heavily clustered industries 
will link backwards to intermediate good suppliers and forwards to industrial 
customers across borders.  While prosperity is partially based on international 
exporting, it is also true that a significant portion of the resulting increase in incomes 
will in turn be spent abroad.  It follows that, even in the face of substantial success, 
economic prosperity will be unevenly spread.  Continuing high levels of 
unemployment in Ireland following several years of more than healthy growth can be 
partially attributed to this factor.  Public intervention designed to spread the benefits 
of growth will be necessary.  Local development policies, increased public 
employment, and more generous social welfare provision must play a part in this 
effort. 
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